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On Sober's Criterion of Contrastive Testability

Lutz, Sebastian (2010) On Sober's Criterion of Contrastive Testability. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    Elliott Sober has suggested his criterion of contrastive testability as an improvement over previous criteria of empirical significance like falsifiability. I argue that his criterion renders almost any theory empirically significant because its restrictions on auxiliary assumptions are to weak. Even when the criterion is modified to avoid this trivialization, it fails to meet other conditions of adequacy for a criterion of empirical significance that follow from Sober's position. I suggest to define empirical significance as empirical non-equivalence to a tautology, because this definition does meet the conditions of adequacy. Specifically, it is equivalent to the standard Bayesian criterion of empirical significance whenever all probabilities are defined and contains falsifiability as a special case. This latter feature is important because those conditions of adequacy that apply to criteria of deductive empirical significance single out falsifiability.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Keywords: empirical significance, testability, empiricism, falsifiability
    Subjects: General Issues > Operationalism/Instrumentalism
    General Issues > Science vs. Pseudoscience
    General Issues > Structure of Theories
    General Issues > Theory/Observation
    Depositing User: Sebastian Lutz
    Date Deposited: 14 Dec 2010 07:08
    Last Modified: 18 Apr 2011 07:37
    Item ID: 8424
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8424

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