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The Viability of a Pure-Power Ontology

Ford, Sharon R (2009) The Viability of a Pure-Power Ontology. In: [2009] Metaphysics of Science (Melbourne, July 2-5, 2009).

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    Abstract

    In accounting for the objects and properties of the manifest world, issues include the fundamentality, causal efficacy and ontological robustness of the dispositional (powers, potentials, capacities) versus the non-dispositional (categorical, qualitative). Concerning fundamentality, the available options seem to be that: (i) dispositional and categorical properties are different kinds, both fundamental; (ii) dispositional and categorical properties are one and the same, and fundamental; (iii) only categorical properties are fundamental while dispositional properties, if they exist, are higher-order; and (iv) only dispositional properties are fundamental while categorical properties, if they exist, are higher-order. The viability of option (iv), a pure-power ontology, has met detracting arguments from several quarters. This paper outlines why the fourth option appears nonetheless attractive and provides a defence for its credibility by suggesting how the manifestly qualitative world can be explained without recourse to fundamental categorical properties.


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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Keywords: powers; pure-power theory; light-like networks; dispositional properties; categorical properties
    Subjects: General Issues > Causation
    General Issues > Laws of Nature
    Conferences and Volumes: [2009] Metaphysics of Science (Melbourne, July 2-5, 2009)
    Depositing User: Dr. Sharon R. Ford
    Date Deposited: 17 Feb 2011 10:01
    Last Modified: 17 Feb 2011 10:01
    Item ID: 8487
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8487

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