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The Disanalogy in the Simulation Argument and the Emerald Case

Franceschi, Paul (2011) The Disanalogy in the Simulation Argument and the Emerald Case. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    I propose in this paper a solution to the problem arising from the Simulation argument. I describe first Bostrom's Simulation Argument in detail and its inherent problem. I recall then the implicit analogy underlying the Simulation argument. I show then the inadequacy of this analogy, by pointing out a disanalogy between the human situation corresponding to the Simulation Argument and its underlying urn analogy. I also point out that such disanalogy is also present within the Emerald case, another thought experiment imagined by John Leslie. I proceed then to build another urn analogy, which fits more adequately with the human situation corresponding to the Simulation Argument. I draw lastly the consequences of this alternative analogy and its associated line of reasoning on the conclusion of the Simulation Argument.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Keywords: simulation argument, urn analogy, thought experiment, paradox, Sleeping Beauty problem, Emerald case, Doomsday argument, probability
    Subjects: Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
    General Issues > Thought Experiments
    Depositing User: Paul Franceschi
    Date Deposited: 13 Apr 2011 09:34
    Last Modified: 29 Apr 2012 15:17
    Item ID: 8570
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8570

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