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On a Contrastive Criterion of Testability I: Defining Contrastive Testability

Lutz, Sebastian (2011) On a Contrastive Criterion of Testability I: Defining Contrastive Testability. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Elliott Sober has suggested his contrastive criterion of testability as an improvement over previous criteria of empirical significance like falsifiability or a suggestion within Bayesianism. I argue that Sober’s criterion entails that if one group of people is justified in believing a claim, every group is, and that it tacitly relies on an inconsistent interpretation of probabilistic inequalities. Furthermore, the criterion’s restrictions on the use of auxiliary assumptions are in part redundant and in part unjustified. Most importantly, they are so weak that almost all theories can be contrastively tested. On the basis of these results, I suggest a modification of Sober’s criterion that avoids these problems without abandoning Sober’s core idea.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Lutz, Sebastiansebastian.lutz@gmx.net
Additional Information: Revised first half of "On Sober's Criterion of Contrastive Testability"
Keywords: testability, empirical significance, falsifiability, likelihoodism, Bayesianism, auxiliary assumptions
Subjects: General Issues > Science vs. Pseudoscience
General Issues > Structure of Theories
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Depositing User: Sebastian Lutz
Date Deposited: 18 Apr 2011 11:37
Last Modified: 18 Apr 2011 11:37
Item ID: 8574
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8574

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