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Defending the Semantic View: What it takes

Le Bihan, Soazig (2008) Defending the Semantic View: What it takes. [Published Article]

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    Abstract

    In this paper, a modest version of the Semantic View is motivated as both tenable and potentially fruitful for philosophy of science. An analysis is proposed in which the Semantic View is given as characterized by three main claims. For each of these claims, a distinction is made between stronger and more modest interpretations. It is argued that the criticisms recently leveled against the Semantic View hold only under the stronger interpretations of these claims. However, if one only commits to the modest interpretation for all the claims, then the view obtained, which is called the Modest Semantic View, is tenable and fruitful.


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    Item Type: Published Article
    Keywords: Semantic View, Scientific Theories, Scientific Models, Model Theory, Suppes, van Fraassen, Morrison
    Subjects: General Issues > Models and Idealization
    General Issues > Structure of Theories
    Conferences and Volumes: [2008] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 21st Biennial Mtg (Pittsburgh, PA) > PSA 2008 Contributed Papers
    Depositing User: Soazig Le Bihan
    Date Deposited: 09 May 2011 22:26
    Last Modified: 09 May 2011 22:26
    Item ID: 8599
    Journal or Publication Title: European Journal for Philosophy of Science
    Publisher: Springer
    Official URL: http://www.springerlink.com/content/a5rk85pg8401tv...
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8599

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