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Friedman's Relativised A Priori and Structural Realism: In Search of Compatibility

Ivanova , Milena (2011) Friedman's Relativised A Priori and Structural Realism: In Search of Compatibility. [Published Article]

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    In this article I discuss a recent argument due to Dan McArthur, who suggests that the charge that Michael Friedman's relativised a priori leads to irrationality in theory change can be avoided by adopting structural realism. I provide several arguments to show that the conjunction of Friedman's relativised a priori with structural realism cannot make the former avoid the charge of irrationality. I also explore the extent to which Friedman's view and structural realism are compatible, a presupposition of McArthur's argument. This compatibility is usually questioned, due to the Kantian aspect of Friedman's view, which clashes with the metaphysical premise of scientific realism. I argue that structural realism does not necessarily depend on this premise and as a consequence can be compatible with Friedman's view, but more importantly I question whether Friedman's view really implies mind dependence.

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    Item Type: Published Article
    Keywords: Michael Friedman, Relativized a Priori, Structural Realism, Scientific Realism, Theory Change
    Subjects: General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
    General Issues > Structure of Theories
    General Issues > Theory Change
    Depositing User: Dr Milena Ivanova
    Date Deposited: 21 Jun 2011 07:22
    Last Modified: 21 Jun 2011 07:22
    Item ID: 8680
    Journal or Publication Title: International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
    Publisher: Routledge
    Official URL:

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