Goetzke, Hanns Hagen Einstein's Hole Argument and its Legacy. UNSPECIFIED.
In 1915 not being able to find field equations for a generally covariant theory of gravitation Einstein came up with a fundamental argument against general covariance – the hole argument. This essay discusses the hole argument and focusses on its consequences for substantivalism and determinism. Two different definitions of determinism are introduced and their compatibility with general covariance from a substantivalist's point of view is discussed.
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|Additional Information:||This essay was submitted as part of the required work for the Masters Level course, Part III, in the Department of Applied Mathematics and Theoretical Physics, Cambridge University, May 2011.|
|Keywords:||Einstein's Hole Argument, Substantivalism, Determinism, General Covariance|
|Subjects:||General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory
|Depositing User:||Mr. Hanns Hagen Goetzke|
|Date Deposited:||15 Jul 2011 01:49|
|Last Modified:||10 Jun 2014 20:36|
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