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Generalizing Empirical Adequacy I: Multiplicity and Approximation

Lutz, Sebastian (2011) Generalizing Empirical Adequacy I: Multiplicity and Approximation. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    Based on a formalization of constructive empiricism’s core concept of empirical adequacy, I show that some previous discussions rest on misunderstandings of empirical adequacy. Using one of the inspirations for constructive empiricism, I generalize the concept of a theory to avoid implausible presumptions about the relations of theoretical concepts and observations, and generalize empirical adequacy to allow for lack of knowledge, approximations, and successive gain of knowledge and precision. As a test case, I provide an application of the concepts to a simple interference phenomenon.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Additional Information: Companion piece to " Empirical Adequacy II: Partial Structures" (http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8744).
    Keywords: constructive empiricism; empirical adequacy; approximation; vagueness; subtruth; subvaluation; received view; empirical substructure; empirical embedding; empirical relativized reduct
    Subjects: General Issues > Models and Idealization
    General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
    General Issues > Structure of Theories
    General Issues > Theory/Observation
    Depositing User: Sebastian Lutz
    Date Deposited: 06 Aug 2011 23:45
    Last Modified: 08 Mar 2014 08:30
    Item ID: 8743
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8743

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