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Auxiliary Assumptions, Unification, and Intelligent Design: A Defense of Contrastive Testability

Lutz, Sebastian (2011) Auxiliary Assumptions, Unification, and Intelligent Design: A Defense of Contrastive Testability. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Boudry and Leuridan argue that in a number of cases—and specifically in the case of intelligent design—a theory can be intuitively testable, but not contrastively testable according to Sober’s definition. I argue that their purported counterexamples rely on misunderstandings of the concept of contrastive testability and the version of intelligent design criticized by Sober. I also argue that the liberalization of contrastive testability suggested by Boudry and Leuridan is trivial.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Lutz, Sebastiansebastian.lutz@gmx.net
Keywords: testability; contrastive testability; empirical significance; auxiliary assumptions; unification; intelligent design
Subjects: General Issues > Science vs. Pseudoscience
General Issues > Structure of Theories
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Depositing User: Sebastian Lutz
Date Deposited: 15 Aug 2011 11:26
Last Modified: 15 Aug 2011 11:26
Item ID: 8754
Subjects: General Issues > Science vs. Pseudoscience
General Issues > Structure of Theories
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Date: 27 July 2011
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8754

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