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Auxiliary Assumptions, Unification, and Intelligent Design: A Defense of Contrastive Testability

Lutz, Sebastian (2011) Auxiliary Assumptions, Unification, and Intelligent Design: A Defense of Contrastive Testability. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    Boudry and Leuridan argue that in a number of cases—and specifically in the case of intelligent design—a theory can be intuitively testable, but not contrastively testable according to Sober’s definition. I argue that their purported counterexamples rely on misunderstandings of the concept of contrastive testability and the version of intelligent design criticized by Sober. I also argue that the liberalization of contrastive testability suggested by Boudry and Leuridan is trivial.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Keywords: testability; contrastive testability; empirical significance; auxiliary assumptions; unification; intelligent design
    Subjects: General Issues > Science vs. Pseudoscience
    General Issues > Structure of Theories
    General Issues > Theory/Observation
    Depositing User: Sebastian Lutz
    Date Deposited: 15 Aug 2011 07:26
    Last Modified: 15 Aug 2011 07:26
    Item ID: 8754
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8754

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