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Intentionality versus Constructive Empiricism

Muller, F.A. and Buekens, F.A.I. (2011) Intentionality versus Constructive Empiricism. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    By focussing on the intentional character of observation in science, we argue that Constructive Empiricism – B.C. van Fraassen’s much debated and explored view of science – is inconsistent. We then argue there are at least two ways out of our Inconsistency Argument, one of which is more easily to square with Constructive Empiricism than the other.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Additional Information: To appear in *Erkenntnis*
    Keywords: general philosophy of science, intentionality, empiricism
    Subjects: General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
    Depositing User: F.A. Muller
    Date Deposited: 05 Oct 2011 07:57
    Last Modified: 05 Oct 2011 07:57
    Item ID: 8824
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8824

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