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On Time chez Dummett

Butterfield, Jeremy (2011) On Time chez Dummett. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    I discuss three connections between Dummett's writings about time and philosophical aspects of physics. The first connection (Section 2) arises from remarks of Dummett's about the different relations of observation to time and to space. The main point is uncontroversial and applies equally to classical and quantum physics. It concerns the fact that perceptual processing is so rapid, compared with the typical time-scale on which macroscopic objects change their observable properties, that it engenders the idea of a `common now', spread across space. The other two connections are specific to quantum theory, as interpreted along the lines of Everett. So for these two connections, the physics side is controversial, just as the philosophical side is. In Section 3, I connect the subjective uncertainty before an Everettian `splitting' of the multiverse to Dummett's suggestion, inspired by McTaggart, that a complete, i.e. indexical-free description of a temporal reality is impossible. And in Section 4, I connect Barbour's denial that time is real---a denial along the lines of Everett, rather than McTaggart---to Dummett's suggestion that statements about the past are not determinately true or false, because they are not effectively decidable.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Additional Information: A shorter version will appear in a special issue of European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, about the philosophy of physics, in honour of Michael Dummett.
    Keywords: temporal becoming, the common now, anti-realism about the past, Everrett interpretation of quantum theory, Dummett, McTaggart, Barbour
    Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics > Classical Physics
    Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
    General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
    Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory
    Depositing User: Jeremy Butterfield
    Date Deposited: 17 Oct 2011 07:44
    Last Modified: 17 Oct 2011 07:44
    Item ID: 8848
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8848

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