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Arguing Against Fundamentality

McKenzie, Kerry (2011) Arguing Against Fundamentality. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    This paper aims to open up discussion on the relationship between fundamentality and naturalism, and in particular on the question of whether fundamentality may be denied on naturalistic grounds. A historico-inductive argument for an anti-fundamentalist conclusion, prominent within contemporary metaphysical literature, is examined; finding it wanting, an alternative ‘internal’ strategy is proposed. By means of an example from the history of modern physics - namely S-matrix theory - it is demonstrated that (1) this strategy can generate similar (though not identical) anti-fundamentalist conclusions on more defensible naturalistic grounds, and (2) that fundamentality questions can be empirical questions. Some implications and limitations of the proposed approach are discussed.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Keywords: fundamentality, particle physics, metaphysics of science
    Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics > Fields and Particles
    General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
    General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
    Depositing User: Miss Kerry McKenzie
    Date Deposited: 02 Dec 2011 09:43
    Last Modified: 02 Dec 2011 09:43
    Item ID: 8861
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8861

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