Halvorson, Hans (2011) What scientific theories could not be. [Preprint]
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According to the semantic view of scientific theories, theories are classes of models. I show that this view -- if taken literally -- leads to absurdities. In particular, this view equates theories that are distinct, and it distinguishes theories that are equivalent. Furthermore, the semantic view lacks the resources to explicate interesting theoretical relations, such as embeddability of one theory into another. The untenability of the semantic view -- as currently formulated -- threatens to undermine scientific structuralism.
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|Keywords:||semantic view of theories, received view, constructive empiricism|
|Subjects:||General Issues > Structure of Theories|
|Depositing User:||Hans Halvorson|
|Date Deposited:||11 Dec 2011 15:03|
|Last Modified:||11 Dec 2011 15:03|
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- What scientific theories could not be. (deposited 20 May 2011 02:35)
- What scientific theories could not be. (deposited 11 Dec 2011 15:03)[Currently Displayed]
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