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Propensities and Pragmatism

Suárez, Mauricio (2011) Propensities and Pragmatism. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    Abstract (for The Review of Metaphysics): This paper outlines a genuinely pragmatist conception of propensity, and defends it against common objections to the propensity interpretation of probability, prominently Humphreys’ paradox. The paper reviews the paradox and identifies one of its key assumptions, the identity thesis, according to which propensities are probabilities (under a suitable interpretation of Kolmogorov’s axioms). The identity thesis is also involved in empiricist propensity interpretations deriving from Popper’s influential original proposal, and makes such interpretations untenable. As an alternative, I urge a return to Charles Peirce’s original insights on probabilistic dispositions, and offer a reconstructed version of his pragmatist conception, which rejects the identity thesis. – Correspondence to: msuarez@filos.ucm.es


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Additional Information: Forthcoming in The Journal of Philosophy
    Keywords: propensities, probability, pragmatism, Charles Peirce, Karl Popper
    Subjects: General Issues > Causation
    General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
    General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
    Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
    Depositing User: Mauricio Suárez
    Date Deposited: 18 Dec 2011 15:25
    Last Modified: 11 Sep 2013 12:34
    Item ID: 8957
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8957

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