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ANTIDOTES FOR DISPOSITIONAL ESSENTIALISM

schrenk, markus (2010) ANTIDOTES FOR DISPOSITIONAL ESSENTIALISM. [Published Article]

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    Abstract

    Since the mid-90s dispositionalism, the view that dispositions are irreducible, real properties, gained strength due to forceful counterexamples (finks and antidotes) that could be launched against Humean anti-dispositionalist attempts to reductively analyse dispositional predicates. In the light of these anti-Humean successes, and in combination with ideas surrounding metaphysical necessity put forward by Kripke and Putnam, some dispositionalists felt encouraged to propose a strong anti-Humean view under the name of “Dispositional Essentialism”. In this paper, I show that, ironically, the counterexamples dispositionalists have used against the Humean reductive analysis of dispositional predicates also prove to be problems for a strong form of dispositional essentialism that assimilates dispositionality and metaphysical necessity. Help comes from an unlike ally—Carnapian reductions sentences—but the alliance is not unproblematic.


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    Item Type: Published Article
    Keywords: Carnap, dispositions, laws, necessity
    Subjects: General Issues > Causation
    General Issues > Laws of Nature
    Depositing User: Dr Markus Schrenk
    Date Deposited: 31 Dec 2011 12:48
    Last Modified: 31 Dec 2011 12:48
    Item ID: 8980
    Journal or Publication Title: The Metaphysics of Powers. Their Grounding and their Manifestations.
    Publisher: Routledge
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8980

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