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Is There a Compelling Argument for Ontic Structural Realism?

Morganti, Matteo (2011) Is There a Compelling Argument for Ontic Structural Realism? [Published Article]

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    Abstract

    Structural realism first emerged as an epistemological thesis aimed to avoid the so-called pessimistic meta-induction on the history of science. Some authors, however, suggested that the preservation of structure across theory-change is best explained by endorsing the metaphysical thesis that structure is all there is. While the possibility of this latter, „ontic‟ form of structural realism has been extensively debated, though, not much has been said concerning its justification. In this paper, I distinguish between two arguments in favour of ontic structural realism that can be reconstructed from the literature, and find both of them wanting.


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    Item Type: Published Article
    Keywords: Structural Realism; Ontic; Epistemic; Underdetermination; Relations
    Subjects: General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
    Depositing User: Dr. Matteo Morganti
    Date Deposited: 31 Jan 2012 08:49
    Last Modified: 31 Jan 2012 08:49
    Item ID: 9003
    Journal or Publication Title: Philosophy of Science
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9003

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