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Presentism/Eternalism and Endurantism/Perdurantism: why the unsubstantiality of the first debate implies that of the second1

Dorato, Mauro (2012) Presentism/Eternalism and Endurantism/Perdurantism: why the unsubstantiality of the first debate implies that of the second1. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    The main claim that I want to defend in this paper is that the there are logical equivalences between eternalism and perdurantism on the one hand and presentism and endurantism on the other. By “logical equivalence” I mean that one position is entailed and entails the other. As a consequence of this equivalence, it becomes important to inquire into the question whether the dispute between endurantists and perdurantists is authentic, given that Savitt (2006) Dolev (2006) and Dorato (2006) have cast doubts on the fact that the debate between presentism and eternalism is about “what there is”. In this respect, I will conclude that also the debate about persistence in time has no ontological consequences, in the sense that there is no real ontological disagreement between the two allegedly opposite positions: as in the case of the presentism/eternalism debate, one can be both a perdurantist and an endurantist, depending on which linguistic framework is preferred


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Keywords: Metaphysics of time, Persistence, perdurantism, endurantism, presentism, eternalism
    Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory
    Depositing User: Mauro Dorato
    Date Deposited: 24 Feb 2012 06:49
    Last Modified: 05 Dec 2012 18:43
    Item ID: 9027
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9027

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