Céspedes, Esteban (2011) Preemption and a Dilemma for Causal Decision Theory. SICSS 2011.
Abstract
One of the lessons given by the prisoners' dilemma is that collective decisions are more rational when they are based not only on evidence, but also on causal relations. This is solved by causal decision theory. However, the notion of causation this theory is based on confronts further problems in preemption cases. It will be shown briefly that preemption does not occur less frequently in social and economic situations than in prisoners' dilemma and usual causal scenarios. Group decision theory and competition are clear (and perhaps not the only) examples of that. It will be argued that, in order to solve a so called preemption dilemma, the smallest theoretical alteration should be focused on preemption rather than on the dilemma. Amongst the most relevant approaches, structural equation models and ranking analysis of causation provide appropriate answers.
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