Franceschi, Paul (2012) On the Disanalogy in the Simulation Argument. [Preprint]
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I propose in this paper a solution to the problem arising from the Simulation argument. I describe first Bostrom's Simulation Argument in detail and its inherent problem. I recall then the implicit analogy underlying the Simulation argument. I show then the inadequacy of this analogy, by pointing out a disanalogy between the human situation corresponding to the Simulation Argument and its underlying urn analogy. I point out that such disanalogy is also present within the Emerald case, another thought experiment imagined by John Leslie. I proceed then to build an alternative analogy, which fits more adequately with the human situation corresponding to the Simulation Argument. I draw lastly the consequences of the presence of two alternative analogies on the conclusion of the Simulation Argument.
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|Keywords:||simulation argument, urn analogy, thought experiment, paradox, Sleeping Beauty problem, Emerald case, Doomsday argument, probability|
|Subjects:||Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics|
General Issues > Thought Experiments
|Depositing User:||Paul Franceschi|
|Date Deposited:||29 Apr 2012 15:17|
|Last Modified:||29 Apr 2012 15:17|
Available Versions of this Item
- The Disanalogy in the Simulation Argument and the Emerald Case. (deposited 13 Apr 2011 09:34)
- On the Disanalogy in the Simulation Argument. (deposited 29 Apr 2012 15:17)[Currently Displayed]
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