PhilSci Archive

On the Disanalogy in the Simulation Argument

Franceschi, Paul (2012) On the Disanalogy in the Simulation Argument. [Preprint]

This is the latest version of this item.

[img]
Preview
 PDF - Updated Version
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives.
Download (120Kb) | Preview

    Abstract

    I propose in this paper a solution to the problem arising from the Simulation argument. I describe first Bostrom's Simulation Argument in detail and its inherent problem. I recall then the implicit analogy underlying the Simulation argument. I show then the inadequacy of this analogy, by pointing out a disanalogy between the human situation corresponding to the Simulation Argument and its underlying urn analogy. I point out that such disanalogy is also present within the Emerald case, another thought experiment imagined by John Leslie. I proceed then to build an alternative analogy, which fits more adequately with the human situation corresponding to the Simulation Argument. I draw lastly the consequences of the presence of two alternative analogies on the conclusion of the Simulation Argument.

    Export/Citation:EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
    Social Networking:
    Share |
    Item Type: Preprint
    Keywords: simulation argument, urn analogy, thought experiment, paradox, Sleeping Beauty problem, Emerald case, Doomsday argument, probability
    Subjects: Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
    General Issues > Thought Experiments
    Depositing User: Paul Franceschi
    Date Deposited: 29 Apr 2012 15:17
    Last Modified: 29 Apr 2012 15:17
    Item ID: 9102
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9102

    Available Versions of this Item

    Actions (login required)

    		 View Item

    Document Downloads