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Challenges to Bayesian Confirmation Theory

Norton, John D. (2012) Challenges to Bayesian Confirmation Theory. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    While Bayesian analysis has enjoyed notable success with many particular problems of inductive inference, it is not the one true and universal logic of induction. I review why the Bayesian approach fails to provide this universal logic of induction. Some of the reasons arise at the global level through the existence of competing systems of inductive logic. Others emerge through an examination of the individual assumptions that, when combined, form the Bayesian system: that there is a real valued magnitude that expresses evidential support, that it is additive and that its treatment of logical conjunction is such that Bayes' theorem ensues.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Keywords: Bayes confirmation induction probability
    Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
    Depositing User: John Norton
    Date Deposited: 12 May 2012 09:18
    Last Modified: 12 May 2012 09:18
    Item ID: 9111
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9111

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