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Reconsidering the Argument from Underconsideration

Mizrahi, Moti (2012) Reconsidering the Argument from Underconsideration. In: [2012] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg (San Diego, CA) > PSA 2012 Contributed Papers.

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    Abstract

    According to the argument from underconsideration, since theory evaluation is comparative, and since scientists do not have good reasons to believe that they are epistemically privileged, it is unlikely that our best theories are true. In this paper, I examine two formulations of this argument, one based on van Fraassen’s “bad lot” premise and another based on what Lipton called the “no-privilege” premise. I consider several moves that scientific realists might make in response to these arguments. I then offer a revised argument that is a middle ground between realism and anti-realism, or so I argue.


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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Keywords: anti-realism, argument from underconsideration, bad lot, epistemic privilege, scientific realism
    Subjects: General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
    Conferences and Volumes: [2012] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg (San Diego, CA) > PSA 2012 Contributed Papers
    Depositing User: Dr. Moti Mizrahi
    Date Deposited: 20 Jun 2012 08:28
    Last Modified: 01 Nov 2013 18:19
    Item ID: 9170
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9170

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