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Causal relations and explanatory strategies in physics

Wayne, Andrew (2012) Causal relations and explanatory strategies in physics. In: [2012] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg (San Diego, CA) > PSA 2012 Contributed Papers.

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    Abstract

    Many philosophers now regard causal approaches to explanation as highly promising, even in physics. This is due in large part to James Woodward’s influential argument that a wide range of explanations (including explanations in physics) are causal, based on his interventionist approach to causation. This article focuses on explanations, widespread in physics, involving highly idealized models. These explanations are not causal, yet they do not fall under any of the types of non-causal explanation Woodward describes. I argue that causal explanation is simply not as widespread or important in physics as Woodward and others maintain.


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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Keywords: explanation; causation; physics; models; idealization
    Subjects: General Issues > Causation
    General Issues > Explanation
    General Issues > Models and Idealization
    Specific Sciences > Physics
    Conferences and Volumes: [2012] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg (San Diego, CA) > PSA 2012 Contributed Papers
    Depositing User: Andrew Wayne
    Date Deposited: 21 Jun 2012 06:32
    Last Modified: 21 Jun 2012 06:32
    Item ID: 9179
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9179

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