Szabo, Laszlo E. (2012) Mathematical Facts in a Physicalist Ontology. [Preprint]
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Abstract
If physicalism is true, everything is physical. In other words, everything supervenes on, or is necessitated by, the physical. Accordingly, if there are logical/mathematical facts, they must be necessitated by the physical facts of the world. The aim of this paper is to clarify what logical/mathematical facts actually are and how these facts can be accommodated in a purely physical world.
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| Item Type: | Preprint |
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| Keywords: | physicalism, mathematical truth, formalism, formal system, physical theory, empiricism |
| Subjects: | General Issues > Theory/Observation General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism General Issues > Laws of Nature Specific Sciences > Mathematics General Issues > Reductionism/Holism General Issues > Structure of Theories Specific Sciences > Physics |
| Depositing User: | Laszlo E. Szabo |
| Date Deposited: | 01 Jul 2012 00:24 |
| Last Modified: | 22 Jul 2013 04:38 |
| Item ID: | 9197 |
| URI: | http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9197 |
Available Versions of this Item
- How can physics account for mathematical truth? (deposited 07 May 2010)
- Mathematical Facts in a Physicalist Ontology. (deposited 01 Jul 2012 00:24)[Currently Displayed]
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