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Moore's Problem

António, Zilhão (2012) Moore's Problem. In: [2012] Seventh Quadrennial Fellows Conference of the Center for Philosophy of Science (12-14 June 2012; Mugla, Turkey).

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    Abstract

    Moore’s problem or Moore’s ‘paradox’ arises from the fact that consistent propositions of the form of (1) and (2): (1) It is raining but I believe it is not raining (2) It is raining but I don’t believe it is raining strike us as being contradictory. Shoemaker explained this oddity by producing a proof that belief in such sentences is either inconsistent or self-refuting. For Sorensen many propositional attitudes have scopes smaller than the class of consistent propositions. Inaccessible consistent propositions are ‘blindspots’. Moore-propositions are the blindspots of belief. According to either, Moore-propositions are unbelievable. I argue that Moore-propositions are actually believable.

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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Keywords: Criteria of Doxastic Admissibility, Desiderata of Belief Formation, Logical Paradoxes, Rationality
    Subjects: General Issues > Thought Experiments
    Conferences and Volumes: [2012] Seventh Quadrennial Fellows Conference of the Center for Philosophy of Science (12-14 June 2012; Mugla, Turkey)
    Depositing User: António Zilhão
    Date Deposited: 14 Jul 2012 20:27
    Last Modified: 05 Dec 2012 18:31
    Item ID: 9229
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9229

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