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Moore's Problem

António, Zilhão (2012) Moore's Problem. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

Moore’s problem or Moore’s ‘paradox’ arises from the fact that consistent propositions of the form of (1) and (2):

(1) It is raining but I believe it is not raining
(2) It is raining but I don’t believe it is raining

strike us as being contradictory. Shoemaker explained this oddity by producing a proof that belief in such sentences is either inconsistent or self-refuting. For Sorensen many propositional attitudes have scopes smaller than the class of consistent propositions. Inaccessible consistent propositions are ‘blindspots’. Moore-propositions are the blindspots of belief. According to either, Moore-propositions are unbelievable. I argue that Moore-propositions are actually believable.


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Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
António, ZilhãoAntonioZilhao@fl.ul.pt
Keywords: Criteria of Doxastic Admissibility, Desiderata of Belief Formation, Logical Paradoxes, Rationality
Subjects: General Issues > Thought Experiments
Depositing User: António Zilhão
Date Deposited: 15 Jul 2012 00:27
Last Modified: 05 Dec 2012 23:31
Item ID: 9229
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9229

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