António, Zilhão (2012) Moore's Problem. In:  Seventh Quadrennial Fellows Conference of the Center for Philosophy of Science (12-14 June 2012; Mugla, Turkey).
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Moore’s problem or Moore’s ‘paradox’ arises from the fact that consistent propositions of the form of (1) and (2):
(1) It is raining but I believe it is not raining
(2) It is raining but I don’t believe it is raining
strike us as being contradictory. Shoemaker explained this oddity by producing a proof that belief in such sentences is either inconsistent or self-refuting. For Sorensen many propositional attitudes have scopes smaller than the class of consistent propositions. Inaccessible consistent propositions are ‘blindspots’. Moore-propositions are the blindspots of belief. According to either, Moore-propositions are unbelievable. I argue that Moore-propositions are actually believable.
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|Item Type:||Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)|
|Keywords:||Criteria of Doxastic Admissibility, Desiderata of Belief Formation, Logical Paradoxes, Rationality|
|Subjects:||General Issues > Thought Experiments|
|Conferences and Volumes:|| Seventh Quadrennial Fellows Conference of the Center for Philosophy of Science (12-14 June 2012; Mugla, Turkey)|
|Depositing User:||António Zilhão|
|Date Deposited:||14 Jul 2012 20:27|
|Last Modified:||05 Dec 2012 18:31|
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