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No Levels, No Problems: Downward Causation in Neuroscience

Eronen, Markus (2012) No Levels, No Problems: Downward Causation in Neuroscience. In: [2012] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg (San Diego, CA) > PSA 2012 Contributed Papers.

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    Abstract

    I show that the recent account of levels in neuroscience proposed by Bechtel and Craver is unsatisfactory, since it fails to provide a plausible criterion for being at the same level and is incompatible with Bechtel and Craver’s account of downward causation. Furthermore, I argue that no distinct notion of levels is needed for analyzing explanations and causal issues in neuroscience: it is better to rely on more well-defined notions such as composition and scale. One outcome of this is that there is no distinct problem of downward causation.


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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Keywords: level, mechanism, composition, scale, downward causation, neuroscience
    Subjects: General Issues > Causation
    General Issues > Explanation
    Specific Sciences > Biology > Neuroscience
    General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
    Conferences and Volumes: [2012] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg (San Diego, CA) > PSA 2012 Contributed Papers
    Depositing User: Dr. Markus Eronen
    Date Deposited: 25 Jul 2012 11:37
    Last Modified: 25 Jul 2012 11:37
    Item ID: 9250
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9250

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