Eronen, Markus (2012) No Levels, No Problems: Downward Causation in Neuroscience. In: UNSPECIFIED.
I show that the recent account of levels in neuroscience proposed by Bechtel and Craver is unsatisfactory, since it fails to provide a plausible criterion for being at the same level and is incompatible with Bechtel and Craver’s account of downward causation. Furthermore, I argue that no distinct notion of levels is needed for analyzing explanations and causal issues in neuroscience: it is better to rely on more well-defined notions such as composition and scale. One outcome of this is that there is no distinct problem of downward causation.
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|Item Type:||Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)|
|Keywords:||level, mechanism, composition, scale, downward causation, neuroscience|
|Subjects:||General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Explanation
Specific Sciences > Biology > Neuroscience
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
|Depositing User:||Dr. Markus Eronen|
|Date Deposited:||25 Jul 2012 15:37|
|Last Modified:||25 Jul 2012 15:37|
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