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God Knows (But does God Believe?)

Murray, Dylan and Sytsma, Justin and Livengood, Jonathan (2012) God Knows (But does God Believe?). [Preprint]

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Abstract

The standard view in epistemology is that propositional knowledge entails belief. Positive arguments are seldom given for this entailment thesis, however; instead, its truth is typically assumed. Against the entailment thesis, Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel (forthcoming) report that a non trivial percentage of people think that there can be propositional knowledge without belief. In this paper, we add further fuel to the fire, presenting the results of four new studies. Based on our results, we argue that the entailment thesis does not deserve the default status that it is typically granted. We conclude by considering the alternative account of knowledge that Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel propose to explain their results, arguing that it does not explain ours. In its place we offer a different explanation of both sets of findings—the conviction account, according to which belief, but not knowledge, requires mental assent.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Murray, Dylan
Sytsma, Justin
Livengood, Jonathan
Additional Information: Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies.
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
Specific Sciences > Psychology/Psychiatry
Depositing User: Justin Sytsma
Date Deposited: 21 Aug 2012 14:19
Last Modified: 21 Aug 2012 14:19
Item ID: 9279
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9279

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