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On a Straw Man in the Philosophy of Science - A Defense of the Received View

Lutz, Sebastian (2012) On a Straw Man in the Philosophy of Science - A Defense of the Received View. [Published Article]

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Abstract

The Received View on scientific theories as developed by Carnap, Hempel, and Feigl is now generally considered to have failed for a variety of reasons, bringing down a number of dependent philosophical analyses and contributing to the demise of logical empiricism. In a first step toward a rehabilitation of the Received View, I defend it against some major criticisms that are based on four misconceptions. First, I dispute the claim that the Received View demands axiomatizations of scientific theories in first-order logic and the further claim that the axiomatizations must include axioms for the mathematics used in the theories. Next, I contend that scientific models are important according to the Received View. Finally, I argue against the claim that the Received View is intended to make the concept of a theory more precise. Rather, it is meant as a generalizable framework for explicating specific theories.


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Item Type: Published Article
Keywords: received view, syntactic view, semantic view, axiomatization, explication
Subjects: General Issues > Structure of Theories
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
Conferences and Volumes: [2010] British Society for the Philosophy of Science Annual Conference 2010 (Dublin; July 8-9, 2010)
Depositing User: Sebastian Lutz
Date Deposited: 31 Oct 2012 21:57
Last Modified: 31 Oct 2012 21:57
Item ID: 9394
Journal or Publication Title: HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science
Publisher: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science
Official URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/664460
DOI or Unique Handle.: 10.1086/664460
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9394

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