Lutz, Sebastian (2012) On a Straw Man in the Philosophy of Science - A Defense of the Received View. [Published Article]

Abstract

The Received View on scientific theories as developed by Carnap, Hempel, and Feigl is now generally considered to have failed for a variety of reasons, bringing down a number of dependent philosophical analyses and contributing to the demise of logical empiricism. In a first step toward a rehabilitation of the Received View, I defend it against some major criticisms that are based on four misconceptions. First, I dispute the claim that the Received View demands axiomatizations of scientific theories in first-order logic and the further claim that the axiomatizations must include axioms for the mathematics used in the theories. Next, I contend that scientific models are important according to the Received View. Finally, I argue against the claim that the Received View is intended to make the concept of a theory more precise. Rather, it is meant as a generalizable framework for explicating specific theories.

Available Versions of this Item

• On a Straw Man in the Philosophy of Science - A Defense of the Received View. (deposited 01 Aug 2010)
  • On a Straw Man in the Philosophy of Science - A Defense of the Received View. (deposited 31 Oct 2012 21:57)[Currently Displayed]

Actions (login required)