PhilSci Archive

Presentism as an empirical hypothesis

Brading, Katherine (2012) Presentism as an empirical hypothesis. In: UNSPECIFIED.

[img]
Preview
PDF
2012_PSA_Presentism.pdf

Download (63kB)

Abstract

Within philosophy of physics it is broadly accepted that presentism as an empirical hypothesis has been falsified by the development of special relativity. In this paper, I identify and reject an assumption common to both presentists and advocates of the block universe, and then offer an alternative version of presentism that does not begin from spatiotemporal structure, which is an empirical hypothesis, and which has yet to be falsified. I fear that labelling it “presentism” dooms the view, but I don’t know what else to call it.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Brading, Katherinekbrading@nd.edu
Keywords: presentism special relativity law-constitutive
Subjects: General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory
Depositing User: Katherine A. Brading
Date Deposited: 09 Nov 2012 14:06
Last Modified: 09 Nov 2012 14:06
Item ID: 9428
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9428

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item