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Presentism as an empirical hypothesis

Brading, Katherine (2012) Presentism as an empirical hypothesis. In: [2012] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg (San Diego, CA) > PSA 2012 Contributed Papers.

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    Abstract

    Within philosophy of physics it is broadly accepted that presentism as an empirical hypothesis has been falsified by the development of special relativity. In this paper, I identify and reject an assumption common to both presentists and advocates of the block universe, and then offer an alternative version of presentism that does not begin from spatiotemporal structure, which is an empirical hypothesis, and which has yet to be falsified. I fear that labelling it “presentism” dooms the view, but I don’t know what else to call it.


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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Keywords: presentism special relativity law-constitutive
    Subjects: General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
    Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory
    Conferences and Volumes: [2012] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg (San Diego, CA) > PSA 2012 Contributed Papers
    Depositing User: Katherine A. Brading
    Date Deposited: 09 Nov 2012 09:06
    Last Modified: 09 Nov 2012 09:06
    Item ID: 9428
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9428

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