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Inconsistency and Scientific Realism

Saatsi, Juha (2013) Inconsistency and Scientific Realism. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    I erect a framework within the semantic view of theories for explaining the empirical success of internally inconsistent models and theories, with scientific realism in mind. The framework is an instance of the ‘content-driven’ approach to inconsistency, advocated by both Norton (1987) and Smith (1988), whose ideas my analysis aims to clarify and substantiate.

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    Item Type: Preprint
    Additional Information: Forthcoming in Synthese
    Keywords: Inconsistency; Realism
    Subjects: General Issues > Models and Idealization
    General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
    Depositing User: Juha Saatsi
    Date Deposited: 15 Feb 2013 09:09
    Last Modified: 15 Feb 2013 09:09
    Item ID: 9568
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9568

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