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The Kuhnian mode of HPS

Schindler, Samuel (2013) The Kuhnian mode of HPS. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    In this article I argue that a methodological challenge to an integrated history and philosophy of science approach put forth by Ron Giere almost forty years ago can be met by what I call the Kuhnian mode of History and Philosophy of Science (HPS). Although in the Kuhnian mode of HPS norms about science are motivated by historical facts about scientific practice, the justifiers of the constructed norms are not historical facts. The Kuhnian mode of HPS therefore evades the naturalistic fallacy which Giere’s challenge is a version of. Against the backdrop of a discussion of Laudan’s normative naturalism I argue that the Kuhnian mode of HPS is a superior form of naturalism which establishes contact to the practice of science without making itself dependent on its contingencies.

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    Item Type: Preprint
    Additional Information: forthcoming in Synthese
    Keywords: history and philosophy of science, naturalistic fallacy, normativity, normative naturalism, rationality, counterfactuals
    Subjects: General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
    General Issues > History of Science Case Studies
    General Issues > Philosophers of Science
    General Issues > Science vs. Pseudoscience
    General Issues > Theory Change
    General Issues > Values In Science
    Depositing User: Samuel Schindler
    Date Deposited: 28 Feb 2013 10:39
    Last Modified: 28 Feb 2013 10:39
    Item ID: 9592
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9592

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