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Can Interventionists be Neo-Russellians? Interventionism, the Open Systems Argument and the Arrow of Entropy

Reutlinger, Alexander (2013) Can Interventionists be Neo-Russellians? Interventionism, the Open Systems Argument and the Arrow of Entropy. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Several proponents of the interventionist theory of causation have recently argued for a neo-Russellian account of causation. The paper discusses two strategies for interventionists to be neo-Russellians. Firstly, I argue that the open systems argument – the main argument for a neo-Russellian account advocated by interventionists – fails. Secondly, I explore and discuss an alternative for interventionists who wish to be neo-Russellians: the statistical mechanical account. Although the latter account is an attractive alternative, it is argued that interventionists are not able to adopt it straightforwardly. Hence, to be neo-Russellians remains a challenge to interventionists.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Reutlinger, AlexanderAlexander.Reutlinger@uni-koeln.de
Additional Information: forthcoming in International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
Keywords: Russell on causation, neo-Russellian views of causation, interventionist theories of causation, causation in the special sciences, statistical mechanical account of causation
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Laws of Nature
Specific Sciences > Physics > Statistical Mechanics/Thermodynamics
Depositing User: Alexander Reutlinger
Date Deposited: 13 Mar 2013 13:49
Last Modified: 13 Mar 2013 13:49
Item ID: 9618
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Laws of Nature
Specific Sciences > Physics > Statistical Mechanics/Thermodynamics
Date: 2013
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9618

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