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Mechanisms, Laws, and Regularities

Andersen, Holly (2011) Mechanisms, Laws, and Regularities. [Published Article]

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    Abstract

    Leuridan argued that mechanisms cannot provide a genuine alternative to laws of nature as a model of explanation in the sciences, and he advocates Mitchell’s pragmatic account of laws. I first demonstrate that Leuridan gets the order of priority wrong among mechanisms, regularity, and laws, and then make some clarifying remarks about how laws and mechanisms relate to regularities. Mechanisms are not an explanatory alternative to regularities; they are an alternative to laws. The existence of stable regularities in nature is necessary for either model of explanation: regularities are what laws describe and what mechanisms explain.

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    Item Type: Published Article
    Keywords: mechanisms; explanation; causation; regularities; laws
    Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology
    General Issues > Causation
    General Issues > Explanation
    General Issues > Laws of Nature
    Depositing User: Dr. Holly Andersen
    Date Deposited: 13 Mar 2013 09:51
    Last Modified: 13 Mar 2013 09:51
    Item ID: 9620
    Publisher: University of Chicago
    Official URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/659229 .
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9620

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