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Pragmatic Interests and Imprecise Belief

Armendt, Brad (2012) Pragmatic Interests and Imprecise Belief. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Does the strength of a particular belief depend upon the significance we attach to it? Do we move from one context to another, remaining in the same doxastic state concerning p, yet holding a stronger belief that p in one context than in the other? For that to be so, a doxastic state must have a certain sort of context-sensitive complexity. So the question is about the nature of belief states, as we understand them, or as we think a theory should model them. I explore the idea, and how it relates to work on imprecise probabilities and second-order confidence.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Armendt, Bradarmendt@asu.edu
Additional Information: Presented at PSA 2012
Keywords: Belief; Stakes; Degrees of Belief; Belief Strength; Categorical Belief; Stake-sensitive; Stake-invariant; Imprecise Belief; Imprecise Probability; Indeterminate Belief; Sharpening
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Depositing User: Brad Armendt
Date Deposited: 16 May 2013 03:59
Last Modified: 16 May 2013 03:59
Item ID: 9765
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Date: December 2012
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9765

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