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Pragmatic Interests and Imprecise Belief

Armendt, Brad (2012) Pragmatic Interests and Imprecise Belief. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    Does the strength of a particular belief depend upon the significance we attach to it? Do we move from one context to another, remaining in the same doxastic state concerning p, yet holding a stronger belief that p in one context than in the other? For that to be so, a doxastic state must have a certain sort of context-sensitive complexity. So the question is about the nature of belief states, as we understand them, or as we think a theory should model them. I explore the idea, and how it relates to work on imprecise probabilities and second-order confidence.

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    Item Type: Preprint
    Additional Information: Presented at PSA 2012
    Keywords: Belief; Stakes; Degrees of Belief; Belief Strength; Categorical Belief; Stake-sensitive; Stake-invariant; Imprecise Belief; Imprecise Probability; Indeterminate Belief; Sharpening
    Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
    General Issues > Models and Idealization
    Depositing User: Brad Armendt
    Date Deposited: 15 May 2013 23:59
    Last Modified: 15 May 2013 23:59
    Item ID: 9765
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9765

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