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Optimal Committee Performance: Size versus Diversity

Stone, Peter and Kagotani, Koji (2013) Optimal Committee Performance: Size versus Diversity. In: [2013] 6th Munich-Sydney-Tilburg Conference on Models and Decisions (Munich; 10-12 April 2013).

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    Abstract

    The Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT), together with a large and growing literature of ancillary results, suggests two conclusions. First, large committees outperform small committees, other things equal. Second, heterogeneous committees can, under the right circumstances, outperform homogeneous ones, again other things equal. But this literature has done little to bring these two conclusions together. This paper employs simulations to compare the respective contributions of size and difference to optimal committee performance. It demonstrates that the contributions depend dramatically upon bias. In the presence of low bias, committee composition matters little. In the presence of high bias, it can matter a great deal; optimal committee performance, however, does not vary dramatically between low- and high-bias committees.


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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Keywords: Condorcet Jury Theorem, Collective Decision-Making, Diversity, Simulations
    Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
    Conferences and Volumes: [2013] 6th Munich-Sydney-Tilburg Conference on Models and Decisions (Munich; 10-12 April 2013)
    Depositing User: Dr. Peter Stone
    Date Deposited: 02 Jul 2013 01:02
    Last Modified: 02 Jul 2013 01:02
    Item ID: 9857
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9857

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