Experimental Realism Defended: How Inference to the Most Likely Cause Might Be Sound
Suarez, Mauricio (2005) Experimental Realism Defended: How Inference to the Most Likely Cause Might Be Sound.
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Abstract
On a purely epistemic understanding of experimental realism, manipulation affords a particularly robust kind of causal warrant, which is – like any other warrant – defeasible. I defend a version of Nancy Cartwright’s inference to the most likely cause, and I conclude that this minimally epistemic version of experimental realism is a coherent, adequate and plausible epistemology for science.
| Keywords: | Causal Inference, Experimental Realism, Scientific epistemology |
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| Subjects: | General Issues: Causation General Issues: Philosophers of Science General Issues: Realism/Anti-realism |
| ID Code: | 2252 |
| Deposited By: | Suárez, Mauricio |
| Deposited On: | 07 April 2005 |
| Additional Information: | Forthcoming in L. Bovens and S. Hartmann (eds.), Nancy Cartwright's Philosophy of Science, Routledge. |