Separability and Non-Individuality : Is it possible to
conciliate (at least a form of) Einstein's realism with quantum
mechanics?

Krause, Décio (2005) Separability and Non-Individuality : Is it possible to
conciliate (at least a form of) Einstein's realism with quantum
mechanics?.

Abstract

In this paper we argue that physical theories, including the most
recent ones, even if only implicitly, talk of `objects' (or
`things') of some sort (really, of several sorts), and question the
logico-mathematical apparatus we still use to formulate them, taking
into account what such theories presuppose about these entities. I
shall point out that despite the discourse (or at least some
discourses) goes in the direction of assuming that these quantum
objects would be `new entities' of some kind, distinct from the
traditional physical objects of classical physics, the
logico-mathematical framework we use is still the old one, grounded
on classical logic and set theory, which are committed to atavistic
concepts based on individuals and distinguishable things, in
complete disagreement with our present day conception of quanta. So,
the use of such apparatus would impede us to be in complete
agreement with the ontological commitment the theories of
\textit{quanta} seem to propose. Thus, I move in the direction of
joining those who try to question the `logic of quantum mechanics'
from a different point of view, looking for a formal rationale for a
new ontology.

As a consequence of this move, we can revisit Einstein's ideas on
physical reality and see that, from the perspective of considering
a new kind of object, here termed `non-individuals', it is possible
to sustain that they still obey some of Einstein's conditions for
`physical realities', so that it will be possible to talk of a
`principle of separability' in a sense which is not in complete
disagreement with quantum mechanics. So, Einstein's departure from
quantum mechanics might be softened at least concerning a form of
his realism (locality still remains a challenge of course), for we
guess that the incompatibility between quantum mechanics (field
theories included) and some form of `separability' makes sense only
if the objects of discourse are thought as `classical' objects,
typical of classical ontology.