Constructive Empiricism, Observability, and Three Kinds of Ontological Commitment
Contessa, Gabriele (2006) Constructive Empiricism, Observability, and Three Kinds of Ontological Commitment.
There is a more recent version of this eprint available. Click here to view it.
Full text available as: |
Abstract
In this paper, I argue against constructive empiricism that, as far as science is concerned, observability is not an adequate criterion as a guidance of cautious ontological commitment. My argument is in two stages. First, I argue that constructive empiricist choice of observability as a criterion for ontological commitment is based on the assumption that belief in the existence of unobservable entities is unreasonable because belief in the existence of an entity can only be vindicated by its observation. Second, I argue that the kind of ontological commitment that is under consideration when accepting a theory is commitment to what I call a theoretical kind and that observation can vindicate commitment to kinds only in exceptional cases.
| Keywords: | constructive empiricism; observability; onotological commitment; natural kinds; theoretical kinds |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | General Issues: Realism/Anti-realism |
| ID Code: | 2650 |
| Deposited By: | Contessa, Gabriele |
| Deposited On: | 09 March 2006 |
| Additional Information: | This is the penultimate version of a paper to appear in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. Please quote only from the published version. |
Available Versions of this Item
- Constructive Empiricism, Observability, and Three Kinds of Ontological Commitment (deposited 09 March 2006) [Currently Displayed]