Representation, Interpretation, and Surrogative Reasoning

Contessa, Gabriele (2007) Representation, Interpretation, and Surrogative Reasoning.

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Abstract

In this paper, I develop Mauricio Suárez’s distinction between denotation, epistemic representation, and faithful epistemic representation. I then outline an interpretational account of epistemic representation, according to which a vehicle represents a target for a certain user if and only if the user adopts an interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target, which would allow them to perform valid (but not necessarily sound) surrogative inferences from the model to the system. The main difference between the interpretational conception I defend here and Suárez’s inferential conception is that the interpretational account is a substantial account—interpretation is not just a “symptom” of representation; it is that in virtue of what something is an epistemic representation of a something else.

Keywords:representation, models, interpretation, surrogative reasoning, Suarez, interpretational conception of scientific representation; inferential conception
Subjects:General Issues: Models and Idealization
ID Code:3291
Deposited By:Contessa, Gabriele
Deposited On:11 April 2007
Additional Information:The final version of this paper will appear in Philosophy of Science.