The Third Way on Objective Probability: A Skeptic's Guide to Objective Chance
Hoefer, Carl (2007) The Third Way on Objective Probability: A Skeptic's Guide to Objective Chance.
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Abstract
The goal of this paper is to sketch and defend a new interpretation or ‘theory’ of objective chance, one that lets us be sure such chances exist and shows how they can play the roles we traditionally grant them. The account is ‘Humean’ in claiming that objective chances supervene on the totality of actual events, but does not imply or presuppose a Humean approach to other metaphysical issues such as laws or causation. Like Lewis (1994) I take the
Principal Principle to be the key to understanding objective chance. After describing the main features of Humean objective chance (HOC), I deduce the validity of PP for Humean chances, and end by exploring the limitations of Humean chance.
| Keywords: | Probability, Chance, Humeanism, David Lewis, undermining, credence, subjective probability, objective probability, objective chance |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences: Probability/Statistics General Issues: Laws of Nature General Issues: Determinism/Indeterminism |
| ID Code: | 3415 |
| Deposited By: | Hoefer, Carl |
| Deposited On: | 05 July 2007 |
| Additional Information: | Final author's draft, forthcoming in MIND, 2007. This version still has a few very minor errors that will be corrected in the published version. |
Available Versions of this Item
- The Third Way on Objective Probability: A Skeptic's Guide to Objective Chance (deposited 26 October 2005)
- The Third Way on Objective Probability: A Skeptic's Guide to Objective Chance (deposited 05 July 2007) [Currently Displayed]