The premises of Condorcet's jury theorem are not simultaneously justified

Dietrich, Franz (2008) The premises of Condorcet's jury theorem are not simultaneously justified.

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Abstract

Condorcet's famous jury theorem reaches an optimistic conclusion on the correctness of majority decisions, based on two controversial premises about voters: they should be competent and vote independently, in a technical sense. I carefully analyse these premises and show that: (i) whether a premise is justified depends on the notion of uncertainty or probability employed; (ii) no such notion renders both premises simultaneously justified. Especially the independence assumption should be weakened.

Keywords:Condorcet jury theorem, probability, social choice theory, epistemic democracy, social epistemology, common cause, causal network
Subjects:Specific Sciences: Probability/Statistics
General Issues: Decision Theory
General Issues: Confirmation/Induction
General Issues: Causation
Specific Sciences: Economics
ID Code:3939
Deposited By:Dietrich, Franz
Deposited On:13 March 2008