The premises of Condorcet's jury theorem are not simultaneously justified
Dietrich, Franz (2008) The premises of Condorcet's jury theorem are not simultaneously justified.
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Abstract
Condorcet's famous jury theorem reaches an optimistic conclusion on the correctness of majority decisions, based on two controversial premises about voters: they should be competent and vote independently, in a technical sense. I carefully analyse these premises and show that: (i) whether a premise is justified depends on the notion of uncertainty or probability employed; (ii) no such notion renders both premises simultaneously justified. Especially the independence assumption should be weakened.
| Keywords: | Condorcet jury theorem, probability, social choice theory, epistemic democracy, social epistemology, common cause, causal network |
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| Subjects: | Specific Sciences: Probability/Statistics General Issues: Decision Theory General Issues: Confirmation/Induction General Issues: Causation Specific Sciences: Economics |
| ID Code: | 3939 |
| Deposited By: | Dietrich, Franz |
| Deposited On: | 13 March 2008 |