Dynamics of Reason and the Kantian Project

Van Dyck, Maarten (2008) Dynamics of Reason and the Kantian Project. In [2008] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 21st Biennial Mtg (Pittsburgh, PA): PSA 2008 Contributed Papers.

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Abstract

I show why Michael Friedman’s idea that we should view new constitutive frameworks introduced in paradigm-change as members of a convergent series, introduces an uncomfortable tension in his views. It cannot be justified on realist grounds, as this would compromise his Kantian perspective, but his own appeal to a Kantian regulative ideal of reason cannot do the job either. I then explain how to make better sense of the rationality of paradigm-change on what I take to Friedman’s own terms.

Keywords:Friedman Kant convergence
Subjects:General Issues: History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues: Theory Change
General Issues: Philosophers of Science
General Issues: Realism/Anti-realism
Conferences and Volumes:[2008] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 21st Biennial Mtg (Pittsburgh, PA): PSA 2008 Contributed Papers
ID Code:4332
Deposited By:Van Dyck, Maarten
Deposited On:13 November 2008