A note on the Doomsday Argument
Lewis, Peter J. (2009) A note on the Doomsday Argument.
This is the latest version of this eprint.
Full text available as: |
Abstract
I argue that advocates of the Doomsday Argument are faced with a dilemma. If they accept the thirder position regarding self-location, then the Doomsday Argument fails; knowledge of birth rank has no effect on one’s credences concerning the survival of the human species. If they accept the halfer position regarding self-location, then the Doomsday Argument fails; knowledge of birth rank may confirm smaller total human populations over larger ones, but this is not equivalent to confirmation of a shorter future for humanity, and in fact the same evidence may confirm longer future human survival over shorter.
| Keywords: | Doomsday Argument, Sleeping Beauty, confirmation, self-location. |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | General Issues: Confirmation/Induction |
| ID Code: | 4885 |
| Deposited By: | Lewis, Peter J. |
| Deposited On: | 13 September 2009 |
Available Versions of this Item
- A note on the Doomsday Argument (deposited 14 July 2009)
- A note on the Doomsday Argument (deposited 13 September 2009) [Currently Displayed]