info:oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3727info:ofi/fmt:xml:xsd:oai_dc
Probability, Rational Single-Case Decisions and the Monty Hall Problem
Sprenger, Jan
Decision Theory
Confirmation/Induction
Probability/Statistics
The application of probabilistic arguments to single cases and decision-making is a contentious philosophical problem arises in various contexts. This paper focuses on the validity of probabilistic arguments in the Monty Hall problem and a variation thereof. Two claims are made and defended. First, preferring a certain strategy to another in the Monty Hall Problem does not need any recourse to long-run success frequencies. Second, recent attempts to refute the standard solution of the Monty Hall Problem fail.
2007-12
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3727/1/Monty_Hall.pdf
Sprenger, Jan (2007) Probability, Rational Single-Case Decisions and the Monty Hall Problem. [Preprint]
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3727/