Barrett, Jeffrey A. and Dickson, Michael and Purves, Gordon (2013) Prediction Games. [Preprint]

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Abstract

We consider an extension of signaling games to the case of prediction, where one agent (‘sender’) perceives the current state of the world and sends a signal. The second agent (‘receiver’) perceives this signal, and makes a prediction about the next state of the world (which evolves according to stochastic but not entirely random ‘laws’). We suggest that such games may be the basis of a model for the evolution of successful theorizing about the world.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Barrett, Jeffrey A. jabarret@uci.edu Dickson, Michael dickson@sc.edu Purves, Gordon gordon.purves@gmail.com
Additional Information:	This version is a preliminary draft of a paper that we wrote several years ago and are currently revising for submission for publication.
Keywords:	signaling, game theory, prediction
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Economics General Issues > Formal Learning Theory
Depositing User:	Michael Dickson
Date Deposited:	11 Oct 2013 14:28
Last Modified:	11 Oct 2013 14:28
Item ID:	10042
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Economics General Issues > Formal Learning Theory
Date:	2013
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10042

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