Mizrahi, Moti (2013) The Argument from Underconsideration and Relative Realism. [Preprint]

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Abstract

In this paper, through a critical examination of Wray’s version of the argument from underconsideration against scientific realism, I articulate a modest version of scientific realism. This modest realist position, which I call “relative realism,” preserves the scientific realist’s optimism about science’s ability to get closer to the truth while, at the same time, taking on board the antirealist’s premise that theory evaluation is comparative, and thus that there are no good reasons to think that science’s best theories are close to the truth.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Mizrahi, Moti motimizra@gmail.com
Additional Information:	Forthcoming in International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
Keywords:	antirealism; argument from underconsideration; epistemic privilege; K. Brad Wray; relative realism; scientific realism
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User:	Dr. Moti Mizrahi
Date Deposited:	01 Nov 2013 22:19
Last Modified:	01 Nov 2013 22:19
Item ID:	10069
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date:	30 October 2013
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10069

Available Versions of this Item

• Reconsidering the Argument from Underconsideration. (deposited 20 Jun 2012 12:28)
  • The Argument from Underconsideration and Relative Realism. (deposited 01 Nov 2013 22:19) [Currently Displayed]

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