PhilSci Archive

Motivational Realism: The Natural Classification for Pierre Duhem

Darling, Karen Merikangas (2002) Motivational Realism: The Natural Classification for Pierre Duhem. [Preprint]

[img] Microsoft Word (.doc)
Darling.doc

Download (69kB)

Abstract

This paper addresses a central interpretive problem in understanding Pierre Duhem`s philosophy of science. The problem arises because there is textual support for both realist and antirealist readings of his work. I argue that his realist and antirealist claims are different. For Duhem, scientific reasoning leads straight to antirealism. But intuition (reasons of the heart) motivates, without justifying, a kind of realism. I develop this idea to suggest a motivational realist interpretation of Duhem`s philosophy.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Darling, Karen Merikangas
Keywords: Realism/Anti-Realism, Philosophers of Science, History of Philosophy of Science, General Philosophy of Science
Depositing User: Program Committee
Date Deposited: 23 Mar 2003
Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 15:11
Item ID: 1061
Date: 2002
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1061

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item