Sprenger, Jan (2015) Conditional Degree of Belief. [Preprint]

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Abstract

It is a commonplace in epistemology that credences should equal known chances. It is less clear, however, that conditional credences should do so, too. Following Ramsey, this paper proposes a counterfactual interpretation of conditional probability which provides a justification for this equality without relying on the Principal Principle. As a result, we obtain a refined view of Bayesian inference where both learning and supposing have a place.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Sprenger, Jan j.sprenger@uvt.nl
Keywords:	conditional probability, degree of belief, statistical inference, Principal Principle, Ramsey
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User:	Jan Sprenger
Date Deposited:	13 Dec 2015 13:20
Last Modified:	25 Feb 2016 04:06
Item ID:	11798
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date:	7 December 2015
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11798

Available Versions of this Item

• Conditional Degree of Belief. (deposited 13 Dec 2015 13:20) [Currently Displayed]
  • Conditional Degree of Belief. (deposited 25 Feb 2016 04:06)
    • Conditional Degree of Belief. (deposited 25 Jul 2016 17:06)
      • Conditional Degree of Belief. (deposited 06 Oct 2017 05:06)
        • Conditional Degree of Belief and Bayesian Inference. (deposited 13 May 2020 01:43)

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