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From Geometry to Conceptual Relativity

Barrett, Thomas William and Halvorson, Hans (2016) From Geometry to Conceptual Relativity. [Preprint]

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Abstract

The purported fact that geometric theories formulated in terms of points and geometric theories formulated in terms of lines are "equally correct" is often invoked in arguments for conceptual relativity, in particular by Putnam and Goodman. We discuss a few notions of equivalence between �first-order theories, and we then demonstrate a precise sense in which this purported fact is true. We argue, however, that this fact does not undermine metaphysical realism.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Barrett, Thomas Williamthomaswb@princeton.edu
Halvorson, Hanshhalvors@princeton.edu
Keywords: theoretical equivalence, equivalence of theories, geometry, conceptual relativity, many-sorted logic, Putnam, Goodman, Quine, metaphysical realism
Subjects: General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
Specific Sciences > Mathematics
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Depositing User: Thomas Barrett
Date Deposited: 16 Feb 2016 23:16
Last Modified: 16 Feb 2016 23:16
Item ID: 11911
Subjects: General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
Specific Sciences > Mathematics
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Date: 13 February 2016
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11911

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