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On the Received Realist View of Quantum Mechanics

Sznajderhaus, Nahuel (2016) On the Received Realist View of Quantum Mechanics. [Preprint]

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Abstract

In this article I defend that an underlying framework exists among those interpretations of quantum mechanics which crucially consider the measurement problem as a central obstacle. I characterise that framework as the Received View on the realist interpretation of quantum mechanics. In particular, I analyse the extent to which two of the most relevant attempts at quantum mechanics, namely, many worlds interpretations and Bohmian mechanics, belong within the Received View. However, I claim that scientific realism in itself does not entail commitment to such a view, and I propose to consider a form of realism that dissolves the measurement problem. It is simply a stripped down version of realism. I derive the methodological questions in this form of realism, speculating that within it a novel realist interpretation of quantum mechanics could be conceived.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Sznajderhaus, Nahuelphns@leeds.ac.uk
Keywords: scientific realism, quantum mechanics, methodology, intertheory relations
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
General Issues > Theory Change
Depositing User: Mr Nahuel Sznajderhaus
Date Deposited: 29 Jun 2016 15:26
Last Modified: 29 Jun 2016 15:26
Item ID: 12239
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
General Issues > Theory Change
Date: 2016
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12239

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